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Thucydides’ work concludes in the middle of a sentence about the 21st year of a war that 
spanned 27 years. We can resist the temptation to conclude that Thucydides’ work is unfinished 
not only because our author informs us that he lived to see the whole war but because the 
structural outline of his work shows why its abrupt and apparently incomplete conclusion is 
necessary. Careful attention to the broader architecture of Thucydides’ work reveals a movement 
from the tensions within political justice as the Greeks understood it, to a presentation of nature 
as a standard for morality and politics. But in Thucydides’ hands, nature as a standard by which 
one can judge politics and moral virtue must ultimately be exchanged in favor of a return to the 
standard of Greek, and especially Athenian, politics albeit a return mediated by the foregoing 
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reflections on the limits to political life and human nature. The necessity of this return to the 
conventions of Athenian politics is thus at once occasioned and conditioned by an awareness and 
acceptance of the fundamental limits to the moral and political categories that define human life, 
an awareness reflected in the puzzling conclusion of the History. 
In the last sentence of the book, Thucydides reports that the Persian satrap Tissaphernes 
“went to Ephesus and offered sacrifice to Artemis.” By invoking Artemis at the close of his 
work, Thucydides’ artistry recalls our attention to the first words of his epic – “Thucydides an 
Athenian”. By opening his work with the name of an Athenian male and closing it with the name 
of a barbarian goddess, Thucydides invites us to reflect on the many dyads at work in the History 
(peace-war, Athens-Sparta, Greek-barbarian, land-sea, rest-motion, justice-necessity) and to add 
to them human-divine, male-female, reason-generation.  Thucydides’ History presents these 
dyads in a manner that suggests they are all inextricably linked such that one element of a dyad 
cannot be known apart from the element antithetical to it. If one of the effects of these bookends 
is to substitute Thucydides for Apollo, the god of reason and Artemis’ twin brother, then 
Thucydides’ “incomplete” conclusion compels us to wonder how the divine representation of 
generation completes our understanding of its human twin: how does Artemis help us understand 
Thucydides? How might generation complement reason and its artful product that is the History?   
To understand why this might be a fitting conclusion to the work, we need to attend the 
structure of Thucydides’ account of the war, a structure that conveys an argument about the 
priority of politics to human wisdom. For the purposes of the present sketch, we can identify four 
major parts of that structure. While the divisions charted below follow the major acts of the war 
(and coincide with the “Books” that tradition gives us) they also represent the steps of an 
argument internal to the History whose logic I hope to clarify. Needless to say, what follows can 
3 
 
only constitute a sketch of the History’s structure, one whose contours I draw more sharply than 
the History would otherwise allow.   
The Structure of the History  
 
Part One: II.1 to IV.133 
Thucydides opens Part One by noting that his account of the war will follow natural or 
seasonal chronology (II.1). He does not follow the customs of his time by recording events 
according to who held high office (i.e., archons) or who had won high honors at the time of a 
particular event (i.e., Olympic victors). After all, people disagree about when a particular term of 
office began or ended and the celebration of religious festivals or athletic contests can be altered 
by human agreement (V.20.2). The change of seasons, however, occurs entirely independent of 
human agency. And yet Thucydides identifies the years in question by referring to archonships, 
Olympic games, religious festivals and priestess-ships (II.2;cf. V.20.1). We are thus invited to 
wonder whether the proper source of human guidance is a nature that is the same always and 
everywhere and knowable to the unaided human mind. Or should we take our bearings from the 
political community, whose laws and customs vary from place to place?  
Throughout Part One, Thucydides examines a conception of politics which understands 
itself to be an authoritative, self-sufficient whole, one to which all else, even religious custom, is 
subordinate. Much of this first Part is framed by the Theban assault on Plataea whose initial sally 
is frustrated by Plataeans digging through the walls of their private homes to coordinate their 
resistance. By breaking down what separates them as particular individuals the Plataeans 
courageously secure what is common to them all. Thucydides builds on this wonderfully rich 
image when he turns in the immediate sequel to the founding of Athens by Theseus, a man who 
successfully united Athens under one political and religious authority by forcing those in the 
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country to move to the city, people who then carried in with them the doors, shutters and walls of 
their country homes (II.14). That the Athenians clung to what privately separated them even as 
they “united” publicly should prove disconcerting for the creation of a city that sought to place 
the good of the community over that of the individual. And yet, as the experience of the plague 
in Athens reveals, there is such a thing as being too close together (II.53 and II.16-17); perhaps 
distance -- walls, doors -- between us is necessary. To have a healthy city requires striking a 
judicious balance of mixing together and separating. It is the genius of Pericles that he is able to 
do this so effectively. And yet despite his exemplary rule, its successes do not fully resolve the 
tensions at the heart of Greek politics.  
Thucydides’ archaeology (I.2-20) anticipated some of the difficulties with a Greek 
conception of justice that tries to combine a radical love of freedom with devotional submission 
to the law. But these difficulties are given their fullest treatment in the Corcyrean civil war 
(III.69-85), whose report follows the surrender of Plataea to Sparta and Thebes (68, especially 
68.3). The sharp clash of partisan interest in Corcyra punctures the image of a hermetically 
sealed political community, one defined by a shared conception of the just and the good. In 
Corcyra, peaceful and civilized life gives way to a complete or nearly-complete Hobbesian State 
of Nature, one in which the laws of the gods and of men are disregarded almost without shame. 
Almost. For while the conception of politics as a self-sufficient whole rooted in divine and 
ancestral authority might prove problematic, Thucydides prevents us from dismissing political 
life completely. After all, even as they tear each other apart, the Corcyreans do so in the name of 
or motivated by moral categories (III.82.8). It seems we cannot so simply dismiss the importance 
of political life to human nature. Perhaps then supremely talented individuals can look to nature 
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as a standard for their conduct of political affairs, authorizing laws whose weakness in the face 
of human passions suggested that their power rested on little more than convention.   
Thucydides appears to take up this alternative from III.86 to V.17, where he presents the 
careers of two generals, Demosthenes an Athenian, and Brasidas the outstanding Spartan, men 
whose outstanding natures owe virtually nothing to the cities they fight for. Demosthenes 
approaches nature as a guide, one that can be used, imitated and perhaps even improved upon, 
but not one that can be overcome and disregarded. Both his initial failures and his later successes 
can be understood against the backdrop of the earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanoes whose report 
introduces his story (III.87-89). Moreover, his successes derive in part from the proper mixing 
and separating of forces. His victories thus recall Pericles’ unique ability to take the measure of 
and balance the contending forces of Athenian politics, one that Thucydides elsewhere suggests 
(II.102) is predicated on a view of nature that rejects the possibility of providential gods who 
intervene in our affairs according to our understandings of justice.  
For Brasidas, on the other hand, alone in Thrace with an army full of Helots, nature is his 
nature and not the principles of the material world through which he marches on the way to more 
conquests. His greatness is not the product of harnessing the physical world to fit his designs; the 
greatness of Brasidas comes to sight in his sweeping disregard of any and all limits to his 
political ambitions.  Like an earthquake at the time of an eclipse and new moon (IV.52), 
Brasidas’ victorious march through Thrace exhibits an unbridled nature in motion with no 
cosmic light to give it its bearings or to check its flow.  
In the end, the alternatives represented by Demosthenes and Brasidas are both 
inadequate. Demosthenes’ apparent attachment to an indifferent nature reflects an Athenian turn 
of mind, one whose particular openness to nature represents the flip-side of a pious concern for 
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“divine” or unchanging wholes. As the Athenians at Delos strive to create an island of 
unchanging purity, Demosthenes operates militarily on a view of nature whose mechanistic 
principles are forever fixed. Insofar as nature remains unchanging and intelligible to 
Demosthenes, and therefore something that humans can manage for their purposes, it is not 
entirely indifferent to human concerns. And Brasidas cannot represent a solution to the problems 
of political life if only because he seeks to leave behind political life completely. In his Thracian 
campaign, Brasidas wins those glories and honors sought by aspiring tyrants and which are 
reserved for only the most revered, an immortality that belongs to those able to transcend 
political life entirely. And yet, Brasidas can only win the acknowledgment that he seeks for 
himself by a kind of noble suicide in which he leaves behind the means that allowed him to 
demonstrate his greatness in the first place. There may be no greater illustration of the 
incoherence at the core of Greek politics than the illustrious end of this most famous Spartan.   
Part Two offers a backlash against the problems posed to regimes like Sparta by the 
natures of a community’s most impressive individuals. Beginning at V.18, one encounters the 
text of a series of treaties and alliances (V.18, 23, 47, 77, 79). These documents represent the 
effort to stabilize the contending interests of parties jockeying for power. What Pericles managed 
to keep in motion domestically, these treaties try to fix “permanently” in the international realm. 
But all of these treaties and alliances fail and they fail because they insist on the sharpness of 
distinctions that political and human life do not allow. Of course, the failure of treaties here has 
more to do with the limitations of the kind of political speech they represent than it does the 
ever-shifting forces of politics. Thucydides illustrates these limitations to political speech in the 
Part Two: V.18 to V.113 
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dialogue between Athenians and Melians that concludes this Book (V.85-113) the substance and 
outcome of which bears on the status of justice among nations.   
We may summarize that exchange and its significance as follows: in trying to persuade 
the Melians to surrender to them, the Athenians attempt to translate the sign of their superior 
strength into evidence of their superior goodness. They fail at doing so. But even more than that, 
the Athenian envoys involve themselves in an incoherent mess, making the contradictory claim 
that their virtue in practicing rule as they do at once constitutes their nobility, even as it is at the 
same time the instrument, the means by which, they are to earn rule over the Melians, a rule that 
is then to signify their superior worthiness. The Melian dialogue, by revealing the incoherence of 
the Athenians’ effort in this respect, suggests that any attempt by purely human means to 
disclose candidly the link between superior moral goodness and superior power requires a less 
direct route, one that cannot be captured in speeches and certainly not captured in treaties. 
Perhaps the truth about where we should take our rightful guidance from cannot be openly 
revealed to men.   
This may explain why Thucydides notes at the beginning of Book VI that the poetic 
accounts of the ancient past in Sicily are irrelevant from his perspective. If claims of revelation 
cannot provide us with knowledge about what they reveal, then we cannot confirm or deny their 
stories. We therefore need not bother engaging these accounts. Moreover, in this Part Thucydides 
is remarkably silent about the non-human motions that cause so much suffering in the rest of the 
History.  Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian campaign will focus solely on human nature as it 
comes to sight through Athens’ engagement with Syracuse.  
Part Three: VI.1 to VII.87 
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Syracuse represents the Athenian alternative to Athens (VII.55): her government is 
democratic and her citizens are innovative, deliberative and daring. And yet she appears to 
combine these traits without the frenzied erotic longing to rule that plagues her Athenian 
counterparts. The purpose of reflecting on this engagement between the two cities thus seems 
twofold: first, to show the political consequences of an unrestrained eros and second, to see if it 
was possible for a community that otherwise resembled Athens to regulate the erotic impulse to 
pursue empire. Of the latter, Thucydides’ narrative shows Syracuse’s imperial restraint to be the 
product of circumstance not of a principled or lawful resistance to it. As for the former, the love 
of liberty found in the private erotic pursuits of the Athenian tyrannicides (VI.53-59) becomes in 
Athens a tireless push for democratic freedom and the pursuit of limitless empire (VI.90; VI.18). 
In her citizens the pursuit of empire becomes the endless pursuit of gain, comfort and security 
(VI.24.3). In seeking mastery over the entire Mediterranean, Athens aspires to a freedom from 
anything that might limit them as a community or as individuals.   
Athens at its peak proved so successful because it largely managed to respect and 
preserve the political distinctions from which the city’s political energies derived. But in 
pursuing the conquest of all of Sicily Athens sought to overcome or disregard any such 
distinctions as unnecessary boundaries on its own erotic ambitions. The results of such an effort 
prove disastrous. Thus we see the Athenians, in their night attack on heights above Syracuse, fail 
to take Epipolae because the darkness of the night and the similarity of human forms made it 
impossible for them to distinguish friend from foe (VII.44-45). The Doric language spoken by 
both armies also made it possible for the Sicilians to steal the watchword of the attackers and for 
the paeans sung by both sides to strike terror into the hearts of the Athenians. While the 
Athenians share in common with their enemies both speech and “forms”, it is the failure to 
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denote the particular details that give to speech and forms their distinct political and human 
relevance which leads to Athens’ defeat.  
This disaster was followed by others. Thucydides describes the failed Athenian effort to 
“escape” from Sicily as a land-battle at sea.  The defeated Athenians were subsequently forced to 
retreat over land, with troops suffering from dysentery brought on by their having encamped near 
a marshland; that is, their bodies were degraded by something that wasn’t quite water or land 
(VII.47). In an earlier effort to extend their siege works, the Athenians tried to cross the marsh by 
laying down doors and planks; the same material they once used for the walls that defined their 
exclusive common good they now use to overcome a categorical obfuscation found in nature 
(VI.101). Though Athens ultimately fails in Sicily, Thucydides’ artistry tempts us here with the 
intriguing possibility that certain, well-defined political forms are critical to those particular 
distinctions that make our world intelligible.  
From the very beginning, however, the Sicilian campaign was predicated on an almost 
willful disregard of political distinctions. Thucydides tells us that the Athenians were ignorant of 
both the size and population of Sicily (VI.1.1) despite a long experience with the place. When 
the Athenians voted for the expedition, Thucydides indicates that while “eros fell upon all alike” 
(VI.24.3) to set sail there was still a part of the city that silently objected (VI.24.4); Athens sees a 
unified whole where there is yet division. And this political blindness at home leads to strategic 
errors abroad. Thus, despite Nicias’s reminders that the Athenians will need cavalry to counter 
the numerous Sicilian horse (VI.20.4, 21.1), the Athenians only take 30 horses with them 
(VI.43)! To have recognized the need for the knights, that faction within Athens almost certainly 
opposed to the campaign, and to have incorporated them into the expedition would have required 
the Athenians to limit what they hoped to achieve in Sicily in light of their fractured character as 
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a political community. While the disaster in Sicily provides them with a brutal reminder of their 
limitations, such an experience does not lead them to moderate their hopes in the kind of 
wholeness that political life can provide. Instead they exchange despair for confidence.  
The destruction of the Athenian force in Sicily shows the dangers to both politics and 
intelligibility of an erotic longing unrestrained by any limits, natural or divine. As readers of the 
History we are thus impressed with the need for moral and intellectual limits. That need, 
combined with the History’s critique of our ability to know and thus be guided by categorical 
wholes that exist in any pure or absolute sense, recommends to us a return to the kind of limits 
that one finds in Greek, and especially Athenian, political life. In Book VIII Thucydides charts 
this return, beginning with a Spartan-like conception of moderation and culminating in the 
measured regime of Athens’ Five Thousand. It is worth observing here that such a measured 
balance was based on an experience with extreme necessity and not, say, the more traditional 
(i.e., religious) sources of law and order.  
Part Four: VIII 
Thucydides’ praise of this regime suggests that we are to take seriously its chief virtue 
and the encounter with necessity of which it is the product. Such an encounter required the 
Athenians to see things as they are and not as they wished them to be. In this case, that meant 
that parts of the community, if only temporarily, had to suspend their claim to rule on account of 
their worth or deserving, that is on account of their willingness to accept their limited place in the 
new political order. This is made possible only by working through the problems facing the 
Athenians’ hopes for a world in which their superior goodness will be recognized and rewarded. 
But to acknowledge and accept the necessity of such problems is also to accept that we cannot 
hope to know wholes, categories or forms apart from the particulars that make them humanly 
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relevant. It is to accept that we cannot participate in pure or absolute wholes like “justice” or “the 
good” such that by doing so we remedy our fundamental neediness. In other words, it means we 
cannot get beyond the contingent particularities of political life if we hope to satisfy our concern 
to know “the clear truth” (I.20) about human affairs. And this means that our capacity to know 
the world is conditioned by the very insight which occasioned such knowledge; the problematic 
character of Greekness provides us with both the means by which political life can be known for 
what it is and the character of that which is to be known. By being incomplete, the final sentence 
of the History illustrates these insights into our inability to know wholes. And in calling attention 
to Artemis, Thucydides’ divine twin, it tempts us to see Thucydides’ reason as itself a form of 
generation, in this case generating those conditions whereby one can know the world for it is. To 
put it differently, it seems human wisdom requires the presence of a particular kind of politics, 
one which Thucydides experienced for himself and which he allows us to experience in the 
pages of his artfully structured History.  
 
 
